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JUSTICE
by
REV. THOMAS OWEN MARTIN *

In the nineteenth century Law was the aristocrat of the three professions, Law, Medicine, and the Church. Now, however, it finds itself
competing with an ever increasing number of professions in the midst
of which it is in danger of becoming lost. Many lawyers, therefore, are
asking why this has happened and what is to be done about it.'
Cooper suggests that the decline of the profession of law in popular
favor is due in part to the fact that while problems of social justice
currently have assumed the highest place in the basic values of society
the legal profession has, in some quarters, come to be regarded as the
obsequious lackey of the ancien regime, chiefly engaged in helping property and privilege to rescue what little is left to them of their ancestral
possessions. 2 He might also have added that elsewhere the profession
has become the utter slave of the New Order.'
He notes further that the whole theory of law and civil government
has undergone change. For the "separation of powers" theory, which
gave lawyers a sphere of exclusive activity, has been substituted a "balance of power" theory, which may mean anything or nothing. Private
law is declining in importance in relation to public law, and the lawyers'
territory is seriously narrowed. The function of private law and of the
legal profession as social agencies is less today, he feels, than at any
time since the establishment of parliamentary democracy. 4
Another explanation of the decline of the legal profession in
popular favor is that the young lawyer is too prone to regard his highly
competitive profession simply as a means of livelihood and to lose sight
of the fact that the average citizen regards the legal profession simply
and solely as the necessary channel through which the public can obtain
justice. Whereas the lawyer tends to see the public only as potential
clients, the public sees the lawyer as the vendor of justice--at a price.
* Associate Professor of Moral Theology, Catholic University of America; Ph.D. '30,
S. T .D. '35, Anthenaeun of the Pontifical Roman Seminary; J. C. D. '44, LL.B. '47,
LL.M. '49, Catholic University of America.
1 See Rt. Hon. Ld. Cooper, The Profession of the Law Today, 66 Scottish L. Rev.
249-256; compare A. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Bradley, Vol. 1, pp.
272-280.
2 See Cooper, art. cit.
3 See C. Costamagna, Faschismus: Entwicklung und Lehre, 36 Beihefte zum Archiv
fuer Rechts und Sozial-philosophie 317, 319-320; R. Hess, Rede Anlaesslich der Eroeffnungekundgebung des deuschen Juristentages, 1936, 6 Deutsches Recht 217; Smith, The Legal
System, The New Russia, ed. Davis, 153-155.
4 See Cooper, art. cit.

Gardner suggests that it would be better for lawyers to spend their extra
energy in building up again the prestige of the profession rather than
in amassing wealth on which to pay increasingly heavy taxes.'
Building up the prestige of the profession, however, involves convincing the public that lawyers have something special to offer to society,
something which cannot be offered by any other group. The procedure
used so to convince the public may be negative or positive.
Negatively, lawyers have, thus far, drawn a line, told the world their
side constitutes an area in which the lawyer has exclusive privileges,
and have prosecuted and otherwise tried to discourage trespassers, unauthorized practitioners of law. They have buttressed their position by acts
of the legislature, by decisions of courts, and by action by committees of
the Bar associations, but the difficulty still exists. 6 It would seem, then,
that this negative solution is insufficient as a means to restore the profession to its former high place in public esteem.
A positive solution is to develop lawyers whose constant objective
will be to see to it that the public obtains the justice for which it longs.
Dean Griswold notes that as long as society grows and develops the
structure of justice will never be complete, and points out that lawyers
and legal educators must necessarily have justice as their constant objective. He suggests that they may well be conscious of that goal and
undertake a consideration of the relation of the system of laws they
administer to the ideals of justice they hold.'
He notes, too, that the twentieth century has given increasing
recognition to the ethical and social elements in the continuing process
of adjusting human relations. There is a dichotomy, he observes, between law and justice, though they are closely linked, and now more
emphasis is placed on "justice" and less on the relatively rigid concepts
inherent in the word "law." Justice, however, cannot exist apart from
law. The goal is "equal justice under law," a blending of authority,
implicit in law, and an ethical goal, which is the heart of justice.8
Another positive approach is to insist that the true lawyer today must
know more than the law as recorded in the law books. He must be a
specialist in human relations and in the solving of the problems that
concern individuals and society. He must be equally versed in private
5 See E. S. Gardner, Adventures in Justice: A Call to Arms, 37 A. B. A. J. 5-8,
84-85 (1951).
6 See J. S. Broadway, A Better Mousetrap, 33 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 17-23; G. E. Mathieu,
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 24 Wash. L. Rev. 387-395.
7 See E. N. Griswold, Law and Justice in Contemporary Society, 28 Can. B. Rev.
120-128.
8 See Griswold, art. cit.

law and in public law. He must be well-rounded, gifted in understanding the problems of modern society and the relations of individuals
thereto.'
A further suggestion is that Law Schools should not fail to teach
the underlying theories of the subject matter. Legal theory does not
exist in isolation. It describes historic institutions which have purposes
to serve and which are to be seen as part of the structure of modern
society. Ultimately, as everyone knows, the lawyer must advise on matters
of policy. He must be able to translate issues of the present into probable
issues of the future. He must be able to cut through the cliches and
recognize the basic forces which may bring about changes. He must
get a philosophy of law, of institutions in terms of the interests protected.' 0
Of the foregoing positive suggestions for enhancing the prestige
of the legal profession that of Griswold and Gardner, that lawyers
always have justice as their constant and conscious objective, though
less detailed than those of Williams and Levi, seems most likely to
strike a responsive chord both in the members of the profession and in
the general public. It raises, however, the problem: What do we mean
by "justice"?
We are all familiar with the classic definition of Ulpian:1' Justice
is the perpetual and constant will to render each his due,' 2 which may
be explained further by saying that rendering to every man his due is
intended to make sure that neither party may gain by the other's loss.'"
We also think of "natural justice" as the attempt of honorable men to
do that which is fair, 4 that which is founded in equity, in honesty, and
right.'5 We think of justice as the principle of rectitude and just dealing
of men with each other, as conformity with that principle, as integrity
and rectitude, as one of the cardinal virtues.'
We realize that, as Vattel says, justice is the basis of a state, that
human society, far from being an intercourse of assistance and good
offices, would be no longer anything but a vast scene of robbery, if7
there were no respect of this virtue, which secures to everyone his own.'
9 See G. H. Williams, Arthur T. Vanderbilt and Legal Education, 24 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rev. 1-21.
10See E. H. Levi, Legal Education Today, 32 Chi. B. Rec. 151-155.
1 D. 1.1.10.
12 Compare Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 P. 526, 530 (1928).
13Livingston Oil Corp. v. Henson, 90 Oki. 76, 215 P. 1057, 1059 (1923).
14Ralli v. Soc. Anon. di Navigazione'a Vapore "G. L. Premuda," 222 Fed. 994, 1000
(S. D. N. Y. 1915).
15 Kempsey v. Alaginnis, 2 Mich. N. P. 49, 55.
16 Lamborn & Co. v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 569, 576, 106 Ct. Cl. 703 (1946).
17 Quoted in Charge to Grand Jury, Neutrality Laws, 30 Fed. Cas. 1021, 1022; compare
St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, IV, c. 4: "Take away justice and what are realms but great
robber bands ?"

We may, however, reduce the sphere of justice to the mere keeping
of valid covenants,' 8 or to nothing more than a unifying conception in
which desired objects are all embraced according to the supreme law for
individual desires, i.e. that they be guided by the idea of perfect harmony
with all other will contents.19 We may even make it merely a class name
for all sorts of definite working values in legal experience, values which
are ultimately nothing but acceptable wants. 20 We may consider it
simply as a sentiment, excluding any conception of a superior principle.2 '
More practically, we may, with J. S. Mill, call justice a word implying something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but
which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right.22
Not infrequently we may consider justice as a term for rectitude
in the broadest sense, both internal and external. Plato thus considers it
when he discusses the inner rectitude from which outer rectitude flows.
Justice, he says, is concerned
not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and
concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements
within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work
of others-he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and
his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together
the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher,
lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals-when
he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become
one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to
act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of
the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking
and calling that which preserves and cooperates with this harmonious condition
just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom,
and that which at any time impairs this condition23 he will call unjust action,
and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

To have, however, a more workable idea of justice we must distin-

guish it from other virtues. It may well be the greatest of the natural
virtues and may direct the others, to some extent, but it does not supplant them all. Primarily, justice is concerned with the regulation of
man's external activities whereby he comes in contact with his neighbor,
whereas the other virtues are concerned with man's control of himself,

18 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Waller, pp. 97-100.
19 See R. Stammler, Fundamental Tendencies in Modern jurisprudence, 21 Mich. L. Rev.
862 (1923) ; for criticism of Stammler's theories see H. A. Rommen, The Natural Law,
136.
20 See F. V. Harper, Some Implications of juristic Pragmatism, 39 Int. J. of Ethics,
269, 281. This seems to make the importance of the legal profession less than that of the
other sciences upon which lawyers must, according to this theory, depend.
21See L. Duguit, Objective Law, 21 Col. L. Rev. 17, 30-31 (1921); for criticism of
Duguit's theories, see Rommen, op. cit., 143-144.
22 See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, 46.
23 See Plato, Republic, IV, ed. Jowett, 134.

whether in the form of temperance or in the form of courage in facing
difficulties.
Justice is the outstanding one among the moral virtues because it
looks to the welfare of others rather than to one's own welfare. Among
the various kinds of justice that which looks to the welfare of the community, general (legal) justice, is greater than that which looks to the
welfare of the individual. 4
Man has his internal drives which may or may not be regulated
reasonably. He acts under the impulse of these drives and so deals with
external things. In dealing with these external things, engaging in
these exterial activities, he comes in contact with others.
Basically, justice is not concerned with regulating man's internal
drives. They are the concern of other virtues, e.g. temperance and fortitude.25 It is only when these internal drives have some external effect
in man's activities that they come, to some extent, under the control of
justice.26
Justice, then, is concerned not so much with the inner attitudes of
a man-unless it be taken in the very broad sense in which Plato spoke
of it-as with his activities with regard to others. People consider these
activities good or bad in themselves, quite apart from the attitude of the
one who performs them. The goodness or badness is considered on the
basis of the relation of these activities to other persons. The fundamental point which people consider in determining the goodness or badness of the activities is the idea of "debt," i.e. whether the one engaging
in the activity renders to the other with whom he comes in contact what
is somehow "owed" to that other. Justice is the virtue, the habitually
good way of acting, which controls in these matters.
The "other" party with whom a man comes in contact when he
engages in an external activity may be either the community as a whole
or another individual person. Consequently, the virtue of justice can be
distinguished according to its general and its special, or particular,
aspects.28
The general welfare of the community is that toward which the
operations of the individual persons who make up the community are
to tend, just as the welfare of any whole is that toward which the parts
24

See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 11-11, q. 58, a. 12.
q. 58, a. 8.
See S. Th., I-I, q. 60, a. 3.
See S. Th., I-1I, q. 60, a. 2.
See S. Th., 1-11, q. 60, a. 3 ad 2.

25 See S. Th., 11-1I,
26
27
28

thereof are to tend, e.g. as the parts of a machine are to work toward
the completeness and smooth running of the whole machine. The welfare, however, of one individual person is not the reason for the existence
of the other individual person. Consequently, general justice, which is
directed to the general welfare, can extend further to internal impulses,
whereby man is somehow disposed in himself, than can particular justice,
which is directed to the welfare of another individual person. General
justice, however, when it does touch upon internal impulses, which are
properly the object of other virtues, does so to the extent that they influence a man's external operations, i.e. insofar as it commands a member of the community to do great things, and those which pertain to the
temperate man and the kind man, as Aristotle says.2 9
The general welfare of the community and the individual welfare
of one person differ not only in degree but also formally. The idea of
the general welfare of the community is one thing and the idea of individual welfare is another, just as the idea of the whole is one thing and
that of the part is another. Therefore, Aristotle 0 says that they do not
speak properly who say that the state and the household, and other such
things differ only by reason of size and not specificially. 8 ' The general
aspect, therefore, of justice is different from its particular aspect.
Justice in its general aspect, as it provides for the general welfare of
the community guiding the activities of a man as he is a member of that
community, even his internal impulses insofar as they affect his activities
with regard to the community, we expect to find first of all in him or
in those who govern the community. Secondarily, we expect to find this
virtue in the members of the community subject to that government
insofar as they carry out the just dispositions of the government. This
general justice, however, is of the same species whether it is considered
in the government or in the citizens, for it looks, in each case, to the
same formal object, i.e. the general welfare.8 2
Justice in its particular aspect concerns the welfare not of the community but of the individual. It is concerned with seeing that to the individual is rendered what is due to him. It can be subdivided on the basis
of the person or persons who owe this debt to the individual, for the
debt may be owned by another individual or by the community as a whole.
'Commutative justice is that virtue whose object it is to render to
everyone what belongs to him, as nearly as may be, or that which
governs contracts. The term has been compared with "distributive
justice" and it has been said that to render commutative justice the judge
See
SoSee
s1 See
32 See
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Aristotle, Ethics, V, c. 2; S. Th., HI-11, q. 58, a. 9 ad 3.
Aristotle, Politics, I, c. 1.
S. Th., 11-II, q. 58, a. 7 ad 2.
S. Th., II-II, q. 58, a. 6.

must make an equality between the parties, that no one may be a gainer
by another's loss."8
Distributive justice, on the other hand, is that virtue the object of
which is to distribute rewards and punishment to each one according to
his merits, observing a just proportion by comparing one person or fact
with another. 4
Distributive and commutative justice are distinguished not only
according to "one" and "many," i.e. by the fact that commutative justice
regards the debt due from one and distributive the debt due from many,
but according to the different reason for the debt. That which is common property, to be distributed, is due in one way to an individual, and
that which is individual property, to be handed over, is due in another.8"
Aristotle points out, further, that in dealing with the relations between individuals we must consider that not all appear as sui juris. He
distinguishes within the domestic group the relationships to be found
between husband and wife, parent and child, and master and servant.
In the case of these individuals, one is, as it were, a part of the other.
Therefore, he concludes, toward such persons we do not speak of justice
in its usual sense, but rather of "economic," household, justice."6
If we consider, next, the relationship which exists between law
and the virtue of justice we should observe that human law is directed
to the civil community, which is that of men with each other. Men,
however, are directed toward each other through external actions, whereby men communicate with each other. Such a communication pertains
to the idea of justice which is properly directive of the human community.
Therefore, human law does not lay down precepts save concerning the
activities of justice, and if it commands acts of other virtues, e.g.
temperance, courage, kindness, mercy, this it does only insofar as they
take on the character of justice.37 In other words, morals can be determined by human law only insofar as they concern justice, 8 though, as
was said, law can command more for the general welfare of the community than it can as between individuals.
The lawyer seeking to promote justice can, therefore, consider it
first in its broadest sense, as did Plato, and strive for an inner rectitude,
a completeness of all virtue, which will overflow into all his external
actions, thus quietly setting an example for his fellow-men to lead them
to greater justice, and at the same time gaining for himself their respect
for him as a man.
83 Bowman v. McLaughlin, 45 Miss. 461, 465 (1871) ; compare S. Th. I-II, q. 61, a. 1.
34
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38 See
37 See
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S. Th., II-II, q. 61, a. 1 ad 5.
Aristotle, Politics, I, c. 3; Ethics, V, c. 6; see also S. Th., IlI-I, q. 58, a. 7 ad 3.
S. Th., I-II, q. 100, a. 2.
S. Th., 1-11, q. 99, a. 5 ad 1.

He can also promote justice in the stricter sense mentioned whether
he acts as a professional man, as a legislator, a judge, an administrative
official, or as a private citizen. As a professional man he will naturally
be concerned first of all, if it is a question of the rights of his client with
respect to another individual, with the requirements of commutative
justice. He will not, however, forget that both his client and the other
individual are members of a community the welfare of which must be
safeguarded. He will, therefore, in seeking commutative justice for his
client not overlook the effect of his action upon the general welfare of
the community. In this way he will tend to effect that "social justice"
which lawyers are sometimes charged with neglecting.
If he acts as a legislator he will be primarily concerned with the
general welfare of the community, but he will not forget that something may also be owed to the individuals who compose the community.
This may require him to consider the distribution of burdens, e.g. taxes,
or of favors, e.g. exemptions, or it may require him to make proper dispositions directed toward securing equality in the treatment of one member of the community by another. He will realize, too, that in problems
of "household" justice, as Aristotle calls it, the different situation of the
persons involved requires a treatment different from that which they
would have were they entirely sui juris.
If he acts as a judge, especially of a bench whose decision will
consititute a precedent to be followed for the future, he will have in
mind the requirements of general justice, for he is then acting somewhat
as a legislator. He will also have in mind the requirements of commutative justice between the parties, or of "household" justice, as the
case may be. He will also, in certain cases, take into consideration the
requirements of distributive justice.
If the lawyer acts as an administrative official he will, in drafting
his rules, consider the requirements of general justice as well as of commutative justice between the parties who may have disputes to present to
his agency. To the extent that he is in a position to distribute the
burdens or favors of the community to individuals, he will have before
his mind the requirements of distributive justice. In this latter case, as
Aquinas wisely remarks, moderation is required. 9
Acting, finally, as a private citizen, the lawyer can observe the requirements of commutative justice in his dealings with his fellow-men.
He can observe the requirements of distributive justice by being content
with a just distribution and not seeking to overreach others. ° He can
observe the requirements of general justice by carrying out the duties
39 See S. Th., I-II, q. 61, a. 1 ad 1.
40 See S. Th., II-II, q. 61, a. I ad 3.

which are imposed upon him for the general welfare by the law-making
bodies in the community. In his capacity as a member of the people, who
by constitutional theory are the final repository of sovereignty, he can
exercise, in keeping with his individual and professional capabilities, a
general supervision over the dispositions which are made for the general
welfare and over the distributions which are made of common property
as well as over the administration of justice between individual and
individual.
Regulating thus his external activities which bring him into contact
with others in accordance with the requirements of justice as they may
apply to the various possible situations in which he may find himself, it
would seem that the individual member of the legal profession can
demonstrate to the public by actions, which are always more effective
than words, that his constant and conscious goal is justice. The public,
in turn, which is seeking justice and expects to find it at the hands of
the legal profession will then not be disappointed, but will rather come
to see that lawyers have a definite function to perform in society, i.e. the
procurement of justice whether for the community as a whole or for
the individuals therein.

